Fertilizer Plants for the Middle East's Food-Security Push
We will cover why the Middle East’s fertilizer story is really two stories at once: a region that supplies a large share of the world’s nitrogen and phosphate fertilizer, and one of the most import-dependent and water-stressed food markets anywhere. We will also look at what each of the four markets in this series means for companies planning a plant.
Two stories in one region
The Gulf states import an estimated 85% of the food they consume, and individual estimates for Saudi Arabia (around 80%) and the UAE (roughly 80–90%) sit in the same range. That exposure is a large part of why food security has become a stated national priority across the region, from Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 to the UAE’s National Food Security Strategy 2051.
At the same time, the region is a major fertilizer exporter. In 2024, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain together accounted for roughly 23% of global ammonia trade, 34% of global urea trade and 18% of global ammoniated phosphate trade, according to International Fertilizer Association data, and the wider region supplied close to 30% of global exports of major fertilizers. Access to low-cost natural gas is a large part of the reason. One market estimate puts the GCC fertilizer market at about USD 13.5 billion in 2025, growing to roughly USD 18.8 billion by 2032.
The result is a region where fertilizer industrial policy and food-security policy overlap, but not always in the same places. Some markets are producers first and consumers second. Others are still working out how to replace imports.
Four markets, four starting points
| Market | Dominant crops | Fertilizer picture | What's driving new capacity or demand |
|---|---|---|---|
| Saudi Arabia | Wheat, dates, fruit and vegetables, greenhouse crops | Two very large export-oriented producers (SABIC Agri-Nutrients and Ma'aden); domestic demand led by wheat, dates and protected cultivation | SABIC AN's SAN-7 project (+2.6 Mt/yr of urea, taking total capacity from about 4.8 to about 7.4 Mt/yr); Ma'aden's Phosphate 3 expansion; an August 2026 SABIC–Ma'aden MoU on value-added agri-nutrient products |
| UAE | Protected-cultivation vegetables and other controlled-environment crops | Small domestic farm demand, weighted toward fertigation-grade nutrients; a large export-oriented nitrogen base at Ruwais | National Food Security Strategy 2051; Fertiglobe's planned growth in Ruwais (company-wide capacity targeted to rise from 6.6 to 7.6 Mt/yr by 2027, per company statements) |
| Iraq | Wheat, barley, rice, dates | Limited domestic production; heavy reliance on imported urea and DAP; severe water stress | A planned USD 1.6 billion, 1.15 Mt/yr urea plant in Basra; expanding DAP capacity at Khor Al-Zubair; 2026/27 policy measures on fertilizer import duties and procurement |
| Jordan | Tomatoes, cucumbers, potatoes and other Jordan Valley vegetables | Major phosphate and potash producer and exporter; small domestic farm demand | A JPMC–APC agreement (July 2025) for a complex producing pure phosphoric acid and specialty fertilizers at Aqaba and Shidiya |
The pattern is that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are, first of all, producers serving export markets. Iraq is the clearest import-substitution case in the group: a large farming base, limited domestic fertilizer supply and several new private-sector projects aimed at closing the gap. Jordan’s opportunity is different again, and sits in moving from raw phosphate and potash exports toward higher-value downstream products.
The 2026 shipping disruption
Any fertilizer plant plan for this region now has to reckon with the Strait of Hormuz. Following military escalation in late February 2026, commercial passage through the strait fell sharply. The UN’s International Trade Centre estimates that the strait normally carries roughly a third of globally traded urea. Its analysis of April 2026 trade data found urea exports from Hormuz-dependent economies down 83% year on year and ammonia exports down 75%.
As of mid-October 2026, reporting based on the WTO-AXSMarine tracker indicated that fertilizer shipments through the strait remained close to zero in early September. A ceasefire has taken hold and a safe-corridor arrangement has been announced, but shipping companies have cited insurance and security concerns, and traffic had not meaningfully recovered. Some cargo is being rerouted via the Red Sea and Suez Canal or overland. The same reporting notes that sulfur prices above USD 1,000 per tonne are feeding into phosphate production costs in other regions. Conditions in this area can change quickly, so the figures here are as of mid-October 2026.
Which markets are most exposed depends partly on geography:
| Market | Main fertilizer gateway | Position relative to Hormuz |
|---|---|---|
| Saudi Arabia | Jubail and Ras Al-Khair (Gulf coast); Yanbu (Red Sea) | Mixed. East-coast plants ship from inside the Gulf; the Red Sea coast offers an alternative route, and SABIC was reported to have trucked urea overland from Jubail to Yanbu |
| UAE | Ruwais | Inside the Gulf |
| Iraq | Basra and Khor Al-Zubair on the Shatt al-Arab | Inside the Gulf; the planned Basra urea plant is aimed at the domestic market |
| Jordan | Aqaba | Red Sea, outside the strait |
This table reflects where each producer’s main facilities are located; individual cargo routing varies. The practical point for anyone planning a new plant is that route diversity (an alternative port, rail or road link, or storage capacity to ride out a closure) has become a design question, not only a logistics one.
Water is the other shared constraint
Water scarcity shapes all four markets, in different ways. Saudi Arabia’s renewable water resources are reported at under 100 cubic metres per person per year. Iraq depends on the Tigris and Euphrates, with an estimated 70% of its water originating outside its borders. Jordan’s irrigated agriculture has historically accounted for roughly two-thirds of national water use. Fertilizer production is itself water-intensive, which we cover in our article on fertilizer production in water-scarce regions.
Where equipment decisions fit
It would be a stretch to say granulation, drying and blending equipment is directly relevant to every project in this region. The largest urea and DAP trains (SAN-7 and Ma’aden’s phosphate complexes, for example) are typically built around licensor-specific equipment at very large scale. Where the equipment questions tend to matter more is in mid-scale compound and NPK lines built to serve local crop needs.
| Market | Realistic fit for granulation, drying and blending equipment | Why, and the limits |
|---|---|---|
| Saudi Arabia | Mid-scale NPK, specialty and blending lines for the domestic market | The SABIC–Ma'aden MoU points toward value-added products, and many advanced micronutrient and specialty formulations are reportedly still sourced from abroad. Core urea and DAP megaplants are a different scale |
| UAE | Limited | Domestic demand leans toward fertigation-grade products rather than granular NPK; blending and handling for regional distribution is the more plausible angle |
| Iraq | Strongest greenfield potential | Several new projects (including a compound fertilizer project reported at Baiji) will need granulation and drying capacity, and the country has little existing downstream base |
| Jordan | Downstream NPK and specialty lines | Phosphate and potash feedstock is already local, and the JPMC–APC project is explicitly about value-added production |
The country pages in this series go into the specifics for each market.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why is fertilizer production important for food security in the Middle East?
The Gulf states import an estimated 85% of the food they consume, which has made food security a national priority across the region. Domestic fertilizer production supports local agriculture and reduces reliance on imports, particularly in markets such as Iraq, where farming is large but local fertilizer supply is limited.
Is the Middle East a major fertilizer exporter?
Yes. In 2024, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain together accounted for about 34% of global urea trade and 23% of global ammonia trade. The wider region supplied close to 30% of global exports of major fertilizers, largely because of access to low-cost natural gas.
Which Middle East countries offer the best opportunities for new fertilizer plants?
Each market starts from a different position. Saudi Arabia is expanding large export-oriented capacity and moving toward value-added products. The UAE has a large nitrogen base at Ruwais but limited domestic demand. Iraq has the strongest greenfield potential for import substitution. Jordan’s opportunity lies in turning local phosphate and potash into higher-value downstream products.
How has the Strait of Hormuz disruption affected fertilizer trade?
Following military escalation in late February 2026, commercial passage through the strait fell sharply. April 2026 trade data showed urea exports from Hormuz-dependent economies down 83% year on year. As of mid-October 2026, fertilizer traffic had not meaningfully recovered, and some cargo was being rerouted via the Red Sea or overland.
Which fertilizer markets are least exposed to Hormuz shipping risks?
Jordan ships through Aqaba on the Red Sea, outside the strait. Saudi Arabia has an alternative Red Sea route through Yanbu. The UAE and Iraq both ship from inside the Gulf, which makes them more exposed. For new plants, route diversity and storage capacity have become design questions, not only logistics ones.
How does water scarcity affect fertilizer production in the region?
Fertilizer production is water-intensive, and water scarcity shapes all four markets. Saudi Arabia’s renewable water resources are reported at under 100 cubic metres per person per year. Iraq relies heavily on the Tigris and Euphrates, and about 70% of its water originates outside its borders.